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Abstract
Analyticity: Boghossian on Quine
In the wake of scepticism over the lucidity of the analytic/synthetic distinction, Paul 
Boghossian defends the distinction, albeit, the distinction between those statements 
which are synthetic, and those statements which are analytic in a specific kind of way. 
Boghossian holds that analytic statements are either metaphysically analytic (where 
the meaning of the terms in the statement determine the truth of the statement), or 
epistemically analytic (where knowledge of the meaning of the terms in the statement 
justifies  our  knowledge of  the  truth  of  the  statement).  Boghossian’s  claim is  that 
Quine is ambiguous regarding which kind of analyticity is the target of his attack in 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, and that  his  failure to  draw a distinction between 
different  types  of  analyticity  leads  to  his  erroneous  dismissal  of  both  kinds  of 
analyticity and their concomitant theories.  His thought is that Quine was correct to 
dismiss  the  metaphysical  notion  of  analyticity,  and  thus  the  linguistic  theory  of 
necessary truth; but mistaken in dismissing the epistemic notion of analyticity, and 
hence the analytic theory of the a priori.  Within this paper,  I offer an exposition of 
Quine’s  arguments,  as  well  as  Boghossian’s  replies,  before  critically  discussing 
Boghossian’s  arguments  against  metaphysical  analyticity,  as  well  as  purported 
separation of metaphysical and epistemic analyticity.  
